移动边缘计算中的联合服务布局和计算卸载:基于拍卖的方法

Lei Zhang, Zhihao Qu, Baoliu Ye, Bin Tang
{"title":"移动边缘计算中的联合服务布局和计算卸载:基于拍卖的方法","authors":"Lei Zhang, Zhihao Qu, Baoliu Ye, Bin Tang","doi":"10.1109/ICPADS51040.2020.00043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The emerging applications, e.g., virtual reality, online games, and Internet of Vehicles, have computation-intensive and latency-sensitive requirements. Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a powerful paradigm that significantly improves the quality of service (QoS) of these applications by offloading computation and deploying services at the network edge. Existing works on service placement in MEC usually ignore the impact of the different requirements of QoS among service providers (SPs), which is common in many applications such that online game requires extremely low latency and online video requires extremely large bandwidth. Considering the competitive relationship among SPs, we propose an auction-based resource allocation mechanism. We formulate the problem as a social welfare maximization problem to maximize effectiveness of allocated resources while maintaining economic robustness. According to our theoretical analysis, this problem is NP-hard, and thus it is practically impossible to derive the optimal solution. To tackle this, we design multiple rounds of iterative auctions mechanism (MRIAM), which divides resources into blocks and allocates them through multiple rounds of auctions. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our auction-based mechanism is effective in resource allocation and robust in economics.","PeriodicalId":196548,"journal":{"name":"2020 IEEE 26th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Joint Service Placement and Computation Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing: An Auction-based Approach\",\"authors\":\"Lei Zhang, Zhihao Qu, Baoliu Ye, Bin Tang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICPADS51040.2020.00043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The emerging applications, e.g., virtual reality, online games, and Internet of Vehicles, have computation-intensive and latency-sensitive requirements. Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a powerful paradigm that significantly improves the quality of service (QoS) of these applications by offloading computation and deploying services at the network edge. Existing works on service placement in MEC usually ignore the impact of the different requirements of QoS among service providers (SPs), which is common in many applications such that online game requires extremely low latency and online video requires extremely large bandwidth. Considering the competitive relationship among SPs, we propose an auction-based resource allocation mechanism. We formulate the problem as a social welfare maximization problem to maximize effectiveness of allocated resources while maintaining economic robustness. According to our theoretical analysis, this problem is NP-hard, and thus it is practically impossible to derive the optimal solution. To tackle this, we design multiple rounds of iterative auctions mechanism (MRIAM), which divides resources into blocks and allocates them through multiple rounds of auctions. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our auction-based mechanism is effective in resource allocation and robust in economics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":196548,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 IEEE 26th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)\",\"volume\":\"29 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 IEEE 26th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS51040.2020.00043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 IEEE 26th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICPADS51040.2020.00043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

新兴应用,如虚拟现实、在线游戏和车联网,具有计算密集型和延迟敏感的需求。移动边缘计算(MEC)是一种强大的范例,通过在网络边缘卸载计算和部署服务,显著提高了这些应用程序的服务质量(QoS)。现有的关于MEC中服务放置的工作通常忽略了服务提供商(sp)之间对QoS的不同要求的影响,这在许多应用中很常见,例如在线游戏需要极低的延迟,在线视频需要极大的带宽。考虑到供应商之间的竞争关系,提出了一种基于拍卖的资源分配机制。我们将该问题表述为社会福利最大化问题,以在保持经济稳健性的同时最大化分配资源的有效性。根据我们的理论分析,这个问题是np困难的,因此实际上不可能推导出最优解。为了解决这个问题,我们设计了多轮迭代拍卖机制(MRIAM),该机制将资源划分为块,并通过多轮拍卖进行分配。最后,我们进行了广泛的实验,并证明了我们基于拍卖的机制在资源配置方面是有效的,在经济学上是稳健的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Joint Service Placement and Computation Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing: An Auction-based Approach
The emerging applications, e.g., virtual reality, online games, and Internet of Vehicles, have computation-intensive and latency-sensitive requirements. Mobile edge computing (MEC) is a powerful paradigm that significantly improves the quality of service (QoS) of these applications by offloading computation and deploying services at the network edge. Existing works on service placement in MEC usually ignore the impact of the different requirements of QoS among service providers (SPs), which is common in many applications such that online game requires extremely low latency and online video requires extremely large bandwidth. Considering the competitive relationship among SPs, we propose an auction-based resource allocation mechanism. We formulate the problem as a social welfare maximization problem to maximize effectiveness of allocated resources while maintaining economic robustness. According to our theoretical analysis, this problem is NP-hard, and thus it is practically impossible to derive the optimal solution. To tackle this, we design multiple rounds of iterative auctions mechanism (MRIAM), which divides resources into blocks and allocates them through multiple rounds of auctions. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our auction-based mechanism is effective in resource allocation and robust in economics.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信