{"title":"怀疑的理由原教旨主义","authors":"Aleksandar Dobrijević","doi":"10.2298/theo1902153d","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be\n explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most\n closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental\n elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however,\n that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only\n foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of\n these views.","PeriodicalId":374875,"journal":{"name":"Theoria, Beograd","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism\",\"authors\":\"Aleksandar Dobrijević\",\"doi\":\"10.2298/theo1902153d\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be\\n explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most\\n closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental\\n elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however,\\n that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only\\n foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of\\n these views.\",\"PeriodicalId\":374875,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoria, Beograd\",\"volume\":\"24 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoria, Beograd\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo1902153d\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoria, Beograd","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo1902153d","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be
explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most
closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental
elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however,
that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only
foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of
these views.