怀疑的理由原教旨主义

Aleksandar Dobrijević
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摘要

原教旨主义者的原因?认为理性的规范性不能用其他规范性概念来解释,这一主张与理性是规范性领域唯一基本要素的信条最为密切相关。应该原教旨主义者?然而,声称有可能证明“应该”这个概念。是规范性的唯一基础。这两种观点的排他性值得怀疑。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism
?Reasons fundamentalists? argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. ?Ought fundamentalists? claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of ?ought? is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
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