安然事件后的公司治理:第一年

R. Thompson
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在安然和后泡沫经济中的其他公司倒闭之后,可能的监管回应包括联邦监管、州公司法或证券交易所等自我监管组织的治理。这篇评论列出了安然事件发生后第一年每个参与者的反应,并探讨了为什么州法律在此期间选择按部就班。第二部分考察了安然公司提出的一个相关问题——在使用独立实体方面,它是否像在会计处理方面那样突破了极限?它将安然公司对spe的使用与人们更熟悉的在戳破公司面纱的情况下使用独立实体进行了比较,并得出结论认为,传统的戳破、破产或个人责任等公司补救措施可能不如披露信息解决安然公司未来出现的那种滥用行为有效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corporate Governance after Enron: The First Year
In the aftermath of Enron and other corporate failures in the post-bubble economy, the menu of possible regulatory responses included federal regulation, state corporate law, or governance by self-regulatory organizations such as the stock exchanges. This commentary sets out the response of each actor in the first year after Enron and examines why state law chose to stand pat during this period. Part II examines a related problem posed by Enron - did it push the envelope in the use of separate entities as much as it appeared to do in accounting treatment? It compares Enron's use of SPEs to more familiar uses of separate entities in piercing the corporate veil contexts and concludes that the traditional corporate remedies of piercing, bankruptcy, or personal liability are likely to be less effective than disclosure is addressing future abuses of the type that arose in Enron.
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