{"title":"保加利亚的增值税逃税:一般均衡方法","authors":"Aleksandar Vasilev","doi":"10.5202/REI.V8I2.243","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper utilizes an otherwise standard micro-founded general-equilibrium setup, which is augmented with a revenue-extraction mechanism to assess the magnitude of VAT evasion. The model is calibrated to Bulgaria after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2014), as one of the very few countries in Europe with a non-differentiated consumption tax rate, and an economy where VAT revenue makes almost half of total government tax revenue. A computational experiment performed within this setup estimates that on average, the size of evaded VAT is a bit more than one-fourth of output, an estimate which is in line with the figures provided in both Philip (2014) and the European Commission (2014). In addition, model-based simulations suggest that increases in spending on law and order could generate substantial welfare gains by decreasing VAT evasion.","PeriodicalId":328273,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economics and Institutions","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"38","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"VAT Evasion in Bulgaria: A General-Equilibrium Approach\",\"authors\":\"Aleksandar Vasilev\",\"doi\":\"10.5202/REI.V8I2.243\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper utilizes an otherwise standard micro-founded general-equilibrium setup, which is augmented with a revenue-extraction mechanism to assess the magnitude of VAT evasion. The model is calibrated to Bulgaria after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2014), as one of the very few countries in Europe with a non-differentiated consumption tax rate, and an economy where VAT revenue makes almost half of total government tax revenue. A computational experiment performed within this setup estimates that on average, the size of evaded VAT is a bit more than one-fourth of output, an estimate which is in line with the figures provided in both Philip (2014) and the European Commission (2014). In addition, model-based simulations suggest that increases in spending on law and order could generate substantial welfare gains by decreasing VAT evasion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":328273,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economics and Institutions\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-12-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"38\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economics and Institutions\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5202/REI.V8I2.243\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economics and Institutions","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5202/REI.V8I2.243","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
VAT Evasion in Bulgaria: A General-Equilibrium Approach
This paper utilizes an otherwise standard micro-founded general-equilibrium setup, which is augmented with a revenue-extraction mechanism to assess the magnitude of VAT evasion. The model is calibrated to Bulgaria after the introduction of the currency board (1999-2014), as one of the very few countries in Europe with a non-differentiated consumption tax rate, and an economy where VAT revenue makes almost half of total government tax revenue. A computational experiment performed within this setup estimates that on average, the size of evaded VAT is a bit more than one-fourth of output, an estimate which is in line with the figures provided in both Philip (2014) and the European Commission (2014). In addition, model-based simulations suggest that increases in spending on law and order could generate substantial welfare gains by decreasing VAT evasion.