反垄断:它从何而来?它意味着什么?

R. Langlois
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引用次数: 2

摘要

这篇论文是我正在进行的一个名为《公司与二十世纪》的图书项目的一章草稿。在《看得见的手》一书中,阿尔弗雷德·钱德勒主要从技术力量和经济地理的角度解释了美国大型垂直一体化公司的崛起。包括政府政策在内的机构所起的作用相当小。在我自己试图解释20世纪后期垂直整合形式的衰落时,我忠于钱德勒基本上没有制度的方法。这本书将是一次将制度重新引入的练习。它将论证制度,特别是联邦政府实施的各种形式的非市场控制,是解释美国多单位企业兴衰的关键部分。事实上,非市场控制,包括那些为应对本世纪的重大事件而实施的控制,在很大程度上解释了20世纪中叶钱德勒公司的统治地位。非市场控制的一种重要形式——尽管绝不是唯一形式——是反垄断政策。本章追溯了反托拉斯法的历史,并认为《谢尔曼反托拉斯法》远不是一个解决垄断的实际经济问题的连贯尝试,而是产生于19世纪的分配政治经济学。更重要的是,本章认为,反垄断出现的形式对公司来说将是重要的,因为《谢尔曼法》及其后继法案几乎禁止了所有类型的公司间协调机制,从而有效地疏散了匿名市场交易和完全整合之间的空间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Antitrust: Where Did It Come from and What Did It Mean?
This paper is a draft chapter from an ongoing book project I am calling The Corporation and the Twentieth Century. In The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler explained the rise of the large vertically integrated corporation in the United States mostly in terms of forces of technology and economic geography. Institutions, including government policy, played a quite minor role. In my own attempt to explain the decline of the vertically integrated form in the late twentieth century, I stayed true to Chandler’s largely institution-free approach. This book will be an exercise in bringing institutions back in. It will argue that institutions, notably various forms of non-market controls imposed by the federal government, are a critical piece of the explanation of the rise and decline of the multi-unit enterprise in the U. S. Indeed, non-market controls, including those imposed in response to the dramatic events of the century, account in significant measure for the dominance of the Chandlerian corporation in the middle of the twentieth century. One important form of non-market control – though by no means the only form – has been antitrust policy. This chapter traces the history of antitrust and argues that, far from being a coherent attempt to address an actual economic problem of monopoly, the Sherman Antitrust Act emerged from the distributional political economy of the nineteenth century. More importantly, the chapter argues that the form in which antitrust emerged would prove significant for the corporation, as the Sherman Act and its successors outlawed virtually all types of inter-firm coordinating mechanisms, thus effectively evacuating the space between anonymous market transactions and full integration.
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