受过教育的良心:纽曼对良心的描述中的感知与理性

F. Aquino
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摘要

对约翰·亨利·纽曼来说,良心的一个重要特征是感知神圣事物的能力这一特点需要一种道德感。例如,在一些文本中,纽曼将良心描述为“感知一个活生生的、个人的、至高无上的主人的声音或声音的回声”的能力(语法77;参见Philosophical Notebook 59;某些困难247,255;《教区和平原布道》237)。然而,他在他的布道“理性的篡夺”中把事情弄复杂了一点,他说,我们发现道德真理的能力“没有任何可理解的推理过程”(《十五布道》56)。乍一看,人们可以从这句话中得出结论,对纽曼来说,良心和理性不仅是截然不同的,而且前者不需要后者来发现道德真理。在这篇文章中,我认为这样的结论忽略了纽曼在这篇讲道中使用“推理”一词的微妙之处,以及他对良心与理性之间关系的理解。更具体地说,纽曼对理性与良心之间关系的讨论需要在他对信仰与理性的总体描述中进行阐述。例如,纽曼在《在牛津大学布道的十五次布道》中主要关注的问题之一是检查现有的信仰和理性的描述,从而澄清基督教信仰(或任何信仰)可以被认为是理性的条件。良心当然包括一个感性的特征,特别是考虑到纽曼强调它的基本或预先训练的方面,但背景信仰、训练、经验和实践在我们如何学习感知和理解神圣的事物方面起着至关重要的作用。正如我希望表明的那样,纽曼的“受过教育的良心”的概念是由一种隐性推理所渗透(或塑造)的,这种推理的运作是在一个人的意识之外的沿着这些思路,我将把这篇文章的重点限制在纽曼的良心思想的四个方面。第一部分将解释纽曼在什么意义上认为良心是我们认知存在的自然元素。第二部分将阐述纽曼对edu-的概念
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Educated Conscience: Perception and Reason in Newman's Account of Conscience
An important feature of conscience, for John Henry Newman, is the capacity to sense things divine.1 This feature entails a kind of moral perception. In some texts, for example, Newman describes conscience as the capacity to “perceive the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign” (Grammar 77; see also Philosophical Notebook 59; Certain Difficulties 247, 255; Parochial and Plain Sermons 237). However, he complicates things a bit in his sermon, “The Usurpations of Reason,” by stating that our capacity to detect moral truths happens “without any intelligible reasoning process” (Fifteen Sermons 56). At first glance, one may conclude from this quotation that conscience and reason, for Newman, are not only distinct but that the former does not need the latter to detect moral truths. In this article, I argue that such a conclusion misses both the subtlety of Newman’s employment of the term “reasoning” in this sermon and his understanding of the relationship between conscience and reason. More specifically, Newman’s discussion of the relationship between reason and conscience needs to be couched within his overall account of faith and reason. For example, one of Newman’s main concerns in the Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford is to examine existing accounts of faith and reason and thus to clarify the conditions under which Christian belief (or for that matter any belief) can be considered rational. Conscience certainly includes a perceptual feature, especially given Newman’s emphasis on its basic or pre-trained aspect, but background beliefs, training, experience, and practice play a crucial role in how we learn to perceive and make sense of things divine. As I hope to show, Newman’s notion of an “educated conscience” is saturated (or shaped) by a kind of implicit reasoning, the operation of which is external to a person’s awareness.2 Along these lines, I will restrict the focus of this article to four aspects of Newman’s thought on conscience. The first section will explain in what sense Newman thinks of conscience as a natural element of our cognitive existence. The second section will spell out Newman’s notion of an edu-
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