{"title":"面对冲突","authors":"Mike Redmayne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1616200","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The right to confront adverse witnesses has brought the English courts into conflict with the European Court of Human Rights. Drawing on confrontation doctrine in Europe and the United States, this paper argues that there is no convincing rationale for the sort of strong confrontation right found under the ECHR and the US constitution. A more pragmatic approach to confrontation, based on the best evidence principle, is advocated.","PeriodicalId":117557,"journal":{"name":"LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Series","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Confronting Confrontation\",\"authors\":\"Mike Redmayne\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1616200\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The right to confront adverse witnesses has brought the English courts into conflict with the European Court of Human Rights. Drawing on confrontation doctrine in Europe and the United States, this paper argues that there is no convincing rationale for the sort of strong confrontation right found under the ECHR and the US constitution. A more pragmatic approach to confrontation, based on the best evidence principle, is advocated.\",\"PeriodicalId\":117557,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616200\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSE Legal Studies Working Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1616200","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The right to confront adverse witnesses has brought the English courts into conflict with the European Court of Human Rights. Drawing on confrontation doctrine in Europe and the United States, this paper argues that there is no convincing rationale for the sort of strong confrontation right found under the ECHR and the US constitution. A more pragmatic approach to confrontation, based on the best evidence principle, is advocated.