在早期设计步骤中最小化侧通道分析阻力评估的成本

Thomas Korak, Thomas Plos, A. Zankl
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引用次数: 3

摘要

对于芯片设计人员来说,评估实现的侧信道分析(SCA)阻力通常是一项具有挑战性的任务。减少评估所需的时间可以加快重新设计周期,从而降低产品成本。在这项工作中,我们提出了几种方法来根据对称加密原语对SCA攻击的抵抗力来加快对其实现的评估。我们将介绍痕迹的记录、预处理步骤以及用于实施对策的缓解技术。本工作的重点放在受限设备上,例如,用于射频识别应用,因此仅涵盖常见对策的一个子集。在一个实际的例子中,我们展示了如何加快用于近场通信(NFC)应用的专用集成电路(ASIC)芯片的SCA电阻评估。该芯片具有高级加密标准(AES),实现了两种对策:随机插入假轮和洗牌。在评估过程中,我们找到了减轻这两种对策影响的方法。我们的缓解技术显示了在原型上实际执行SCA攻击的重要性,以便识别可能用于增强攻击的小泄漏。总的来说,我们能够将揭示秘密AES密钥所需的痕迹数量从超过3.1*10^6减少到少于20000,这相当于将评估时间从16天减少到不到3小时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Minimizing the Costs of Side-Channel Analysis Resistance Evaluations in Early Design Steps
Evaluating the side-channel analysis (SCA) resistance of an implementation is often a challenging task for a chip designer. Reducing the time required for evaluation allows faster redesign cycles and lowers consequently also product costs. In this work we present several ways to speed up the evaluation of implementations of symmetric cryptographic primitives according to their resistance against SCA attacks. We cover the recording of the traces, the preprocessing steps as well as mitigation techniques for implemented countermeasures. The focus in this work is put on constrained devices, e.g., for radio-frequency identification applications, so only a subset of common countermeasures is covered. In a practical example we show how to speed up the SCA resistance evaluation of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) chip for near-field communication (NFC) applications. The chip has the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with two countermeasures implemented: the random insertion of dummy rounds and shuffling. During our evaluation we found ways to mitigate the impact of both countermeasures. Our mitigation techniques show the importance of practically performing SCA attacks on prototypes in order to identify small leakages which might be used to enhance an attack. Altogether we are able to decrease the number of required traces for revealing the secret AES key from more than 3.1*10^6 to less than 20000 which corresponds to a reduction of the evaluation time from 16 days to less than 3 hours.
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