社会及道德委员会与非股东群体的保护:磨牙问题还是根本没有?

Tangeni Nanyemba, Mikovhe Maphiri
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引用次数: 0

摘要

传统上,股东一直是在公司治理中拥有特权地位的唯一利益相关者,因为他们是董事受托责任的唯一受益者。然而,根据2008年《公司法》第71条第72(4)条(与《公司条例》第43条一起解读),要求某些公司任命社会和道德委员会,可以说,通过向非股东群体提供有限的法律认可,扰乱了对独家股东保护的传统关注。这些规定要求某些公司报告公司的运营如何影响广泛的非股东群体,包括员工、环境、消费者、供应商和社区。因此,社会和道德委员会是一个理想的渠道,使某一公司的董事会对南非国家优先事项敏感起来,例如创造就业机会、适当住房、反腐败、气候变化和获得医疗保健。然而,社会和道德委员会履行其职责并解决公司法下影响非利益相关者选区的相关问题的能力,受到过多的不确定性和模糊性的限制。《公司法》和《公司条例》有许多矛盾之处,因为它们包括了关于委员会作用的一般职权范围,但它们没有明确规定委员会的权力、职能、目标和宗旨。本文将考虑《公司法》第72(4)条与《公司条例》第43条的解读是否为一种可行的机制,可以强制执行以保护非股东群体。对该委员会的缺点进行分析,以确定该委员会是否存在初期问题,或者仅仅是作为一个在南非背景下可以保护非股东群体的委员会无效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Social and Ethics Committee and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Constituencies: Teething Problems or No Teeth at All?
Traditionally, shareholders have been the only stakeholders to hold priviledged positions in the governance of companies because they are the exclusive beneficiaries of the director’s fiduciary duties. However, the requirement for certain companies to appoint social and ethics committees in terms of section 72(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, read with regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations, arguably disrupts the traditional focus on exclusive shareholder protection by offering non-shareholder constituencies limited legal recognition. These provisions require certain companies to report on how the operations of a company impact a broad range of non-shareholder constituencies, which include the employees, the environment, consumers, suppliers, and communities. The social and ethics committee thus presents itself as an ideal conduit for sensitisation of the board of directors of a particular company to issues of national priority in South Africa, such as job creation, adequate housing, anti-corruption, climate change and access to healthcare. However, the ability of the social and ethics committee to deliver on its mandate and to address the concomitant issues affecting non-stakeholder constituencies under company law is curtailed by a plethora of uncertainties and ambiguities. The Companies Act and the Companies Regulations contain many contradictions as they include generic terms of reference regarding the committee’s role and they do not provide clarity about the committee’s powers, functions, objectives and purpose. This article considers whether section 72(4) of the Companies Act read with regulation 43 of the Companies Regulations is a viable mechanism that can be enforced to protect non-shareholder constituencies. The committee’s shortcomings are analysed to determine whether the committee has teething problems or is simply ineffective as a committee that can protect non-shareholder constituencies in the South African context.
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