The Scope and Limits of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Diplomacy

This chapter uses the case studies of the Suez crisis (1956) and the UN mandate for peacekeeping in the Congo (1960-61) to illustrate and analyze in detail the Hammarskjöld diplomacy within his value-based framework, and the context of the rivalry between the Western and Eastern bloc as well as the non-aligned countries of the Global South emerging. It suggests that Hammarskjöld practiced an anti-hegemonic policy. Particular attention is paid to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, and the limitations placed on securing lasting peace and stability after the secession of Katanga under Moise Tshombe, and also his support from Belgium. In addition, this chapter discusses the dilemmas Hammarskjöld faced due to having a vague mandate and also increasingly conflicting with the interests of both the East and the West in the UN Security Council. It seeks to balance his achievements and failures, putting Hammarskjöld’s individual leadership into the wider context of the institutional framework. The UN Security Council’s mandates set boundaries and demarcations, which not only allowed for interventions, but often limited decisive action.