私有化中立性定理:当上市公司追求一般目标时

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Kojun Hamada
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文考察了上市公司追求一般目标而非福利最大化时的私有化中性定理。该定理表明,当政府给予企业最优补贴时,私有化前后的福利完全相同。然而,我们提出了一个看似矛盾的结果。当一家上市公司错误地假设补贴会改变福利规模时,私有化必然是福利中性的,而当一家上市公司正确地认识到补贴只会带来收入再分配,而不会影响福利时,中性的情况就有限了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives

This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.

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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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