多人非合作环境下效用学习的逆相关均衡框架

Aaron M. Bestick, L. Ratliff, Posu Yan, R. Bajcsy, S. Sastry
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引用次数: 12

摘要

在博弈论框架下,给定参数化的智能体效用函数,在每个个体智能体具有相关均衡策略的情况下,求解其效用函数参数可行集的逆问题。我们将代理人建模为效用最大化者,然后将计算参与者效用函数参数的问题作为线性程序,使用他们的游戏导致相关均衡的事实。我们关注智能体必须在其效用函数内的多个竞争组件之间进行权衡的情况。我们首先在一款模拟游戏《Chicken-Dare》中测试我们的方法,然后在一款手机健身游戏的真实测试中收集数据,在这款游戏中,5名玩家必须在保护自己的隐私和获得燃烧卡路里和改善身体健康的奖励之间取得平衡。通过从健身游戏中学到的效用函数,我们希望了解每个用户在保护自己的隐私和实现游戏中其他理想目标方面的相对重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An inverse correlated equilibrium framework for utility learning in multiplayer, noncooperative settings
In a game-theoretic framework, given parametric agent utility functions, we solve the inverse problem of computing the feasible set of utility function parameters for each individual agent, given that they play a correlated equilibrium strategy. We model agents as utility maximizers, then cast the problem of computing the parameters of players' utility functions as a linear program using the fact that their play results in a correlated equilibrium. We focus on situations where agents must make tradeoffs between multiple competing components within their utility function. We test our method first on a simulated game of Chicken-Dare, and then on data collected in a real-world trial of a mobile fitness game in which five players must balance between protecting their privacy and receiving a reward for burning calories and improving their physical fitness. Through the learned utility functions from the fitness game, we hope to gain insight into the relative importance each user places on safeguarding their privacy vs. achieving the other desirable objectives in the game.
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