超大他们吗?大银行、纳税人和中间的补贴

Nizan Geslevich Packin
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引用次数: 2

摘要

2013年,媒体报道称,自2009年初以来,美国六大银行获得的财务优势和补贴的总价值至少为1,020亿美元,这在金融市场引发了冲击波。后续报告估计,如果没有政府的隐性和显性补贴,美国最大的两家银行的利润将是负的。最重要的隐性补贴源于市场的认知,即政府不会允许最大的银行倒闭——也就是说,它们“太大而不能倒”(TBTF)——从而使它们能够以较低的利率借款。虽然《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)试图解决TBTF问题,但它并未禁止政府以一般方式提供财政支持。本文主要关注两件事。首先,本文探讨了ttf补贴及其意想不到的后果。具体而言,本文考察了是否像一些大银行所认为的那样,实际上存在TBTF补贴,并回顾了对有争议的补贴的不同估计。本文描述了由于缺乏任何正式或透明的数据,补贴难以衡量和量化的原因,并讨论了补贴产生的反常影响和激励,例如推动银行借入更多资金,承担过多风险,以及不道德的行为。其次,本文研究了为解决TBTF问题而提出的各种建议,并提出了一个新的用户收费框架,该框架可能有助于解决该问题,并与其他方法一起使用。这篇文章的贡献有三个方面。首先,它提供了一个理论框架来理解政府补贴在过去是如何运作的,特别是在TBTF背景下,这使得可以在未来不同的环境中得出相似之处。其次,本文运用这一框架来证明,目前关于这一问题的工作是不完整的,因为它没有将ttf补贴对经济和政治的影响理论化。最后,本文的分析有益地补充了现有的银行监管法律写作,并为其未来的发展增添了重要的因素。作为第一步,本文解释了补贴造成的问题,并建议政策制定者和市场参与者应该对显性和隐性补贴更加透明,特别是因为纳税人没有资格挑战这种补贴。作为第二步,本文回顾了TBTF问题的建议解决方案的优点和缺点,并建议使用用户收费来帮助解决补贴带来的负面问题,并尽量减少未来金融,社会和政治危机的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Supersize Them? Large Banks, Taxpayers and the Subsidies That Lay Between
In 2013, media reports sent shockwaves across financial markets by estimating that the value of the combined financial advantages and subsidies for the six biggest U.S. banks since the start of 2009 was at least $102 billion. Follow-up reports estimated that the profits of two of America’s largest banks would have been negative if not for implicit and explicit government subsidies. The most significant implicit subsidy stems from market perception that the government will not allow the biggest banks to fail — i.e., that they are “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) — enabling them to borrow at lower interest rates. While the Dodd-Frank Act attempts to solve the TBTF problem, it does not prohibit the government from giving financial support framed in a general fashion.This article focuses on two main things. First, it explores the TBTF subsidies and their unintended consequences. Specifically, the article examines whether there are in fact TBTF subsidies or not, as some of the megabanks believe, and reviews the different estimates of the arguable subsidies. The article describes why it is difficult to measure and quantify the subsidies given the lack of any formal or transparent data, and discusses the perverse effects and incentives that result from the subsidies, such as pushing the banks to borrow more, take excessive risks, and act unethically. Second, the article examines the various proposals that have been suggested to address the TBTF problem, and suggests a new user-fee framework that could be useful in addressing the issue and used together with other approaches.The article’s contributions are three-fold. First, it provides a theoretical framework for understanding how government subsidies have worked in the past, especially in the TBTF context, which enables parallels to be drawn across disparate settings going forward. Second, the article applies that framework to demonstrate that the current body of work on the issue is incomplete because it under-theorizes the TBTF subsidies’ impact on the economy and politics. Finally, the analysis in this article usefully supplements the existing legal writing on regulation of banks, and adds important elements to its future development. As a first step, the article explains the problems created by the subsidies, and suggests that policymakers and market participants should be more transparent about the explicit and implicit subsidies, especially since taxpayers do not have standing to challenge such subsidies. As a second step, the article reviews the advantages and the shortcomings of the suggested solutions to the TBTF problem and suggests using user-fees to help address the negative issues resulting from the subsidies, and minimize the impact of future financial, social and political crises.
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