{"title":"模糊信念更新的实验研究","authors":"M. Cohen, I. Gilboa, J. Jaffray, D. Schmeidler","doi":"10.1017/S1357530900000132","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"‘Ambiguous beliefs’ are beliefs which are inconsistent with a unique, additive prior. The problem of their update in face of new information has been dealt with in the theoretical literature, and received several contradictory answers. In particular, the ‘maximum likelihood update’ and the ‘full Bayesian update’ have been axiomatized. This experimental study attempts to test the descriptive validity of these two theories by using the Ellsberg experiment framework.","PeriodicalId":377089,"journal":{"name":"International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"61","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Experimental Study of Updating Ambiguous Beliefs\",\"authors\":\"M. Cohen, I. Gilboa, J. Jaffray, D. Schmeidler\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S1357530900000132\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"‘Ambiguous beliefs’ are beliefs which are inconsistent with a unique, additive prior. The problem of their update in face of new information has been dealt with in the theoretical literature, and received several contradictory answers. In particular, the ‘maximum likelihood update’ and the ‘full Bayesian update’ have been axiomatized. This experimental study attempts to test the descriptive validity of these two theories by using the Ellsberg experiment framework.\",\"PeriodicalId\":377089,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"61\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357530900000132\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1357530900000132","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An Experimental Study of Updating Ambiguous Beliefs
‘Ambiguous beliefs’ are beliefs which are inconsistent with a unique, additive prior. The problem of their update in face of new information has been dealt with in the theoretical literature, and received several contradictory answers. In particular, the ‘maximum likelihood update’ and the ‘full Bayesian update’ have been axiomatized. This experimental study attempts to test the descriptive validity of these two theories by using the Ellsberg experiment framework.
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