算法敏捷性的现实:DNSSEC算法生命周期研究

M. Müller, W. Toorop, Taejoong Chung, J. Jansen, R. V. Rijswijk-Deij
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引用次数: 10

摘要

DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions)为互联网的命名系统DNS (Domain Name System)增加了数据源认证和数据完整性。对于DNSSEC,使用公钥加密技术将签名添加到DNS中提供的信息中。密码学和密码分析的进步使得有必要在DNSSEC中部署新的算法,并弃用那些安全性较弱的算法。如果这个过程很容易,那么这个协议就达到了IETF所说的“算法敏捷性”。本文研究了DNSSEC算法的生存期。这包括:(i)使算法标准化,(ii)在DNS软件中实现支持,(iii)在域和递归解析器中部署新算法,以及(iv)替换已弃用的算法。使用来自超过670万个签名域和DNS中超过10,000个有利位置的数据,结合定性研究,我们表明DNSSEC仅部分实现了算法敏捷性。新算法的标准化和不安全算法的弃用可能需要数年时间。我们强调了部署新算法的主要障碍,但也讨论了成功因素。这项研究为引入新算法提供了关键的见解,例如当互联网必须过渡到量子安全的公钥加密时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Reality of Algorithm Agility: Studying the DNSSEC Algorithm Life-Cycle
The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System (DNS), the naming system of the Internet. With DNSSEC, signatures are added to the information provided in the DNS using public key cryptography. Advances in both cryptography and cryptanalysis make it necessary to deploy new algorithms in DNSSEC, as well as deprecate those with weakened security. If this process is easy, then the protocol has achieved what the IETF terms "algorithm agility". In this paper, we study the lifetime of algorithms for DNSSEC. This includes: (i) standardizing the algorithm, (ii) implementing support in DNS software, (iii) deploying new algorithms at domains and recursive resolvers, and (iv) replacing deprecated algorithms. Using data from more than 6.7 million signed domains and over 10,000 vantage points in the DNS, combined with qualitative studies, we show that DNSSEC has only partially achieved algorithm agility. Standardizing new algorithms and deprecating insecure ones can take years. We highlight the main barriers for getting new algorithms deployed, but also discuss success factors. This study provides key insights to take into account when new algorithms are introduced, for example when the Internet must transition to quantum-safe public key cryptography.
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