家庭消费集体模型的一个Afriat定理

L. Cherchye, B. Rock, Frederic Vermeulen
{"title":"家庭消费集体模型的一个Afriat定理","authors":"L. Cherchye, B. Rock, Frederic Vermeulen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1264971","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference' characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general individual preferences that can be non-convex. Our main result is the Collective Afriat Theorem, which parallels the well-known Afriat Theorem for the unitary model. First, it provides a characterization of collectively rational consumption behavior in terms of collective Afriat inequalities. Next, it implies the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP) as a testable necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Finally, the theorem has some interesting testability implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.","PeriodicalId":106212,"journal":{"name":"Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"38","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Afriat Theorem for the Collective Model of Household Consumption\",\"authors\":\"L. Cherchye, B. Rock, Frederic Vermeulen\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1264971\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference' characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general individual preferences that can be non-convex. Our main result is the Collective Afriat Theorem, which parallels the well-known Afriat Theorem for the unitary model. First, it provides a characterization of collectively rational consumption behavior in terms of collective Afriat inequalities. Next, it implies the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP) as a testable necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Finally, the theorem has some interesting testability implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.\",\"PeriodicalId\":106212,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family\",\"volume\":\"45 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"38\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264971\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Labor: Demographics & Economics of the Family","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1264971","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 38

摘要

我们根据集体消费模型提供了理性家庭行为的非参数“揭示偏好”特征,同时考虑了一般的非凸个人偏好。我们的主要结果是集体Afriat定理,它与著名的统一模型的Afriat定理相似。首先,它从非洲集体不平等的角度提供了集体理性消费行为的特征。其次,提出了揭示偏好的集体公理(Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference, CARP)作为数据符合集体理性的可检验的充分必要条件。最后,这个定理有一些有趣的可测试性暗示。只有一组有限的观察,消费外部性(积极或消极)在家庭内部分配过程的性质是不可检验的。同样的不可测试性结论也适用于隐私(有或没有外部性)或消费的公共性。相比之下,单个效用函数的凹凸性(表示凸偏好)证明是可测试的。此外,对于假设所有家庭消费都是公共的模型,单调性是可测试的。©2009 Elsevier Inc.
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Afriat Theorem for the Collective Model of Household Consumption
We provide a nonparametric 'revealed preference' characterization of rational household behavior in terms of the collective consumption model, while accounting for general individual preferences that can be non-convex. Our main result is the Collective Afriat Theorem, which parallels the well-known Afriat Theorem for the unitary model. First, it provides a characterization of collectively rational consumption behavior in terms of collective Afriat inequalities. Next, it implies the Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference (CARP) as a testable necessary and sufficient condition for data consistency with collective rationality. Finally, the theorem has some interesting testability implications. With only a finite set of observations, the nature of consumption externalities (positive or negative) in the intra-household allocation process is non-testable. The same non-testability conclusion holds for privateness (with or without externalities) or publicness of consumption. By contrast, concavity of individual utility functions (representing convex preferences) turns out to be testable. In addition, monotonicity is testable for the model that assumes all household consumption is public. © 2009 Elsevier Inc.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信