局部受限聚合

Victor Tadros
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本章为限制聚合论的危害预防观点进行辩护。限制性聚集论认为,在伤害差别不大的情况下,防止对许多人造成较小伤害的聚集,可以证明未能从较大伤害中拯救较小数量的人是合理的。这里所捍卫的观点是,即使防止一系列较小的伤害不能证明不能通过防止更大的伤害来拯救一个人免受更大的伤害,他们可以证明不拯救一个人免受更大伤害的决定是合理的通过平衡其他可能的原因来拯救一个人免受更大的伤害。这种观点被证明比我们更熟悉的限制性聚合主义观点更可取,在限制性聚合主义观点中,防止较小的伤害对不拯救一个人免受更大伤害的决定没有任何帮助。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Localized Restricted Aggregation
This chapter defends a restricted aggregationist view about harm prevention. Restricted aggregationist views claim that preventing an aggregation of smaller harms to many people can justify failing to save a smaller number of people from larger harms in cases where the difference between the harms is not too great. The view defended here is that even if preventing an aggregation of smaller harms cannot justify failing to save a person from a much larger harm by counting against preventing the larger harm, they can justify the decision not to save a person from a much larger harm by counterbalancing other reasons there might be to save the person from a much larger harm. This view is shown to be preferable to a more familiar restricted aggregationist view, where the prevention of smaller harms makes no contribution to the decision not to save a person from a larger harm at all.
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