{"title":"董事会独立性和公司支出","authors":"E. Lie, Keyang Daniel Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3167493","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Non-compliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates over-investment.","PeriodicalId":256682,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Board Independence and Corporate Spending\",\"authors\":\"E. Lie, Keyang Daniel Yang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3167493\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Non-compliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates over-investment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":256682,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-04-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3167493\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Board Decision-Making (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3167493","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the effect of board independence on spending and payout policy using the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ board independence requirements as an exogenous shock. Non-compliant firms that are forced to raise board independence reduce the spending on acquisitions and capital expenditures and increase dividends. We conclude that greater board independence mitigates over-investment.
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