救生艇问题

Kai A. Konrad, D. Kovenock
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引用次数: 25

摘要

我们研究了一个有多个相同奖品(“救生艇座位”)的全付费竞赛。奖品被划分为奖品子集(“救生艇”)。玩家进行两阶段博弈。首先,每个玩家选择分区的一个元素(“救生艇”)。然后,每个玩家在选择的子集(“一个座位”)中竞争奖品。我们描述并比较了所有参与者在第一阶段采用纯策略或所有参与者采用相同混合策略的子博弈完全均衡。我们发现,当参与者采取非退化混合策略时,奖励分配允许参与者之间的协调失败,与一些效率较低的纯策略均衡相比,这可以遮蔽租金并减少租金耗散。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Lifeboat Problem
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats"). Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a twostage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat"). Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen ("a seat"). We characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less efficient pure strategy equilibria.
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