当激励机制与公平竞争发生冲突时

Guy Elaad
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摘要

美国国家冰球联盟(NHL)设计不当的计分方法,会激励球队在与另一个联盟的对手比赛时进入加时赛。在本文中,我发现两支NHL球队在与其他赛区对手的比赛中进入加时赛的比例显著高于与同一赛区对手的比赛进入加时赛的比例。从经济角度看,这两个团队的行为是理性的。联盟中所有其他球队可能不会最大化他们进入季后赛的机会,但他们的行为符合“公平竞争”原则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When Incentives Clash Fair-Play
The ill-designed scoring method in the NHL incentivizes the teams to reach overtimes in matches against rivals from the other conference. In this paper, I find a statistically significant higher percentage of matches that go into overtime against rivals from the other conference than the percentage of matches that go into overtime against rivals from the same conference for two NHL teams. From the economic aspect, the behavior of those two teams is rational. All the other teams in the league may not maximize their chances to qualify to the playoffs, but their behavior is in line with the “Fair-Play” principle.
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