Calling Strikes before He Stepped to the Plate: Why Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Be Used to Enhance Subsequent Adult Sentences

In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that minors in juvenile court have the right to notice of the charges upon which they stand accused, the right to cross-examination, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.' However, four years later, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court determined that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial due to what it considered fundamental differences between the purposes and characteristics of the juvenile and criminal justice system. 2 According to the McKeiver Court, these differences included the juvenile court's superior diagnostic and rehabilitative services, the lower level of culpability indicated through a juvenile adjudication than a criminal conviction, and the intimate, informal, and protective approach of the juvenile system that sought to rehabilitate rather than punish.3 Therefore, the Court concluded, the right to a jury trial would lead to the "traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system." 4 In light of the rationale for different treatment of juvenile adjudications, the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Nguyen, which held that non-jury juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance subsequent sentences beyond the statutory maximum,5 is inconsistent with the long-standing purposes of the juvenile system. Use of prior juvenile adjudications to enhance later adult sentences is contrary to the deliberately drawn boundaries between the juvenile and adult systems. Thus, the California Supreme Court's decision raises serious issues relating to the underlying differences between the juvenile