{"title":"短暂生物识别技术:它们是什么?它们能解决什么问题?","authors":"Sung Choi, David Zage","doi":"10.1109/CCST.2013.6922044","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For critical infrastructure facilities, mitigation techniques for insider threats are primarily non-technical in nature and rely heavily on policies/procedures. Traditional access control measures (access cards, biometrics, PIN numbers, etc.) are built on a philosophy of trust that enables those with appropriate permissions to access facilities without additional monitoring or restrictions. Systems based on these measures have three main limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence; 2) the authentication factors have little impact against human (insider) threats to security systems; and 3) many of the authentication systems inconvenience end-users. In order to mitigate the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose utilizing the concept of Ephemeral Biometrics to construct strong, persistent authentication protocols.","PeriodicalId":243791,"journal":{"name":"2013 47th International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ephemeral Biometrics: What are they and what do they solve?\",\"authors\":\"Sung Choi, David Zage\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CCST.2013.6922044\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"For critical infrastructure facilities, mitigation techniques for insider threats are primarily non-technical in nature and rely heavily on policies/procedures. Traditional access control measures (access cards, biometrics, PIN numbers, etc.) are built on a philosophy of trust that enables those with appropriate permissions to access facilities without additional monitoring or restrictions. Systems based on these measures have three main limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence; 2) the authentication factors have little impact against human (insider) threats to security systems; and 3) many of the authentication systems inconvenience end-users. In order to mitigate the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose utilizing the concept of Ephemeral Biometrics to construct strong, persistent authentication protocols.\",\"PeriodicalId\":243791,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 47th International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 47th International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCST.2013.6922044\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 47th International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCST.2013.6922044","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Ephemeral Biometrics: What are they and what do they solve?
For critical infrastructure facilities, mitigation techniques for insider threats are primarily non-technical in nature and rely heavily on policies/procedures. Traditional access control measures (access cards, biometrics, PIN numbers, etc.) are built on a philosophy of trust that enables those with appropriate permissions to access facilities without additional monitoring or restrictions. Systems based on these measures have three main limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence; 2) the authentication factors have little impact against human (insider) threats to security systems; and 3) many of the authentication systems inconvenience end-users. In order to mitigate the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose utilizing the concept of Ephemeral Biometrics to construct strong, persistent authentication protocols.