短暂生物识别技术:它们是什么?它们能解决什么问题?

Sung Choi, David Zage
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引用次数: 2

摘要

对于关键基础设施,内部威胁的缓解技术本质上主要是非技术性的,严重依赖于政策/程序。传统的访问控制措施(访问卡、生物识别、PIN码等)建立在信任的基础上,使那些具有适当权限的人能够访问设施,而无需额外的监控或限制。基于这些措施的系统有三个主要限制:1)访问通常绑定到单个身份验证事件;2)认证因素对安全系统的人为(内部)威胁影响不大;3)许多认证系统给终端用户带来不便。为了减轻上述缺陷,我们建议利用短暂生物识别的概念来构建强大的、持久的身份验证协议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ephemeral Biometrics: What are they and what do they solve?
For critical infrastructure facilities, mitigation techniques for insider threats are primarily non-technical in nature and rely heavily on policies/procedures. Traditional access control measures (access cards, biometrics, PIN numbers, etc.) are built on a philosophy of trust that enables those with appropriate permissions to access facilities without additional monitoring or restrictions. Systems based on these measures have three main limitations: 1) access is typically bound to a single authentication occurrence; 2) the authentication factors have little impact against human (insider) threats to security systems; and 3) many of the authentication systems inconvenience end-users. In order to mitigate the aforementioned deficiencies, we propose utilizing the concept of Ephemeral Biometrics to construct strong, persistent authentication protocols.
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