基于FPGA侧信道攻击的机器学习在功耗分析中的作用

Ali Hasnain, Yame Asfia, S. G. Khawaja
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如今,基于云的设备由于电力等共享资源而面临许多威胁。攻击者通过使用存在于攻击者租户中的一些远程传感器来测量功率。这些传感器可以部分或完全访问配电网络(PDN),并作为攻击者的后门。在我们的研究中,我们探讨了现场可编程门阵列(fpga)上涉及基于功率分析的侧信道攻击(sca)的潜在安全问题。我们的研究论文有三个主要的贡献。首先,我们讨论了FPGA的功耗分析或功耗分析,它取决于执行某些加密任务时电压波动的泄漏。加密模块的电压波动是由一些物理源(如示波器)或远程源(如延迟线传感器)测量的。其次,我们讨论了基于潜在功率分析的sca,它使用这些电压波动测量来提取密钥。第三,我们设计了一个基于机器学习(ML)和深度学习(DL)模型的框架,用于执行密钥预测和成功攻击。首先,我们的自定义卷积神经网络(CNN)模型揭示了所有16个字节的密钥,并仅以570个攻击功率跟踪执行了成功的攻击。其次,多层感知器(MLP)模型使用相同的框架仅使用3200条迹成功攻击。总体而言,我们在成功攻击所需的功率走线数量、训练时间、预测时间和攻击时间方面取得了更好的性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Role of Machine Learning in Power Analysis Based Side Channel Attacks on FPGA
The cloud-based devices face many threats these days due to shared resources like power. The attacker measures the power by using some remote sensors which are present in attacker tenants. These sensors get partial or full access to a power distribution network (PDN) and work as a backdoor for the attacker. In our research, we explored potential security issues which involved power analysis-based side-channel attacks (SCAs) on Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). We have made three major contributions to our research paper. First, we have discussed the power analysis or power profiling of FPGA, which is dependent upon voltage fluctuations' leakage while performing some encryption tasks. The voltage fluctuations of the cryptographic module are measured by some physical source like an oscilloscope or remote source like delay line sensors. Second, we have discussed potential power analysis-based SCAs that used these measurements of voltage fluctuations to extract the secret key. Third, we have designed a framework based on machine learning (ML) and deep learning (DL) models to perform secret key predictions and successful attacks. Firstly, our custom convolutional neural networks (CNN) model has revealed all 16 bytes of the secret key and performed a successful attack with only 570 attack power traces. Secondly, the multi-layer perceptron (MLP) model has successfully attacked only using 3200 traces using the same framework. Overall we have achieved a better performance in terms of the required number of power traces for a successful attack, training time, prediction time, and attack time.
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