反转的动机

Erez Levy, A. R. Ofer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

显而易见,美国企业的“倒转”输家是美国政府,因为美国政府损失了未来的税收收入。然而,互补的问题——谁从反转中受益,以及为什么会发生反转,并没有一个明确的答案。我们考察了倒置对四种主体的影响:倒置企业的股东、债券持有人和高管;和目标公司的股东(如果通过并购反转实现)。我们的研究结果表明,高管从反转中受益,而反转公司的利益相关者则没有。此外,我们发现目标公司的股东受益于反转。考虑到公司的规模、对美国税收收入的影响以及之前的监管尝试并没有阻止倒置交易,我们认为这些发现具有政策意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Motivation for Inversion
It is obvious who loses from inversion of a U.S firm - the U.S government, which loses future tax income. However, the complementary question- who benefits from inversion and consequently why do inversions occur, does not have a clear answer. We examine the effect of inversion on four entities: The shareholders, bondholders and executives of the inverted firm; and Shareholders of the target firm (if the inversion was done through merger inversion). Our findings indicate that the executives benefit from inversion while the stakeholders of the inverted firm do not. In addition, we find that the shareholders of the target firms benefit from inversion. Considering the size of the firms, the implications on the U.S tax revenues and that previous regulations attempts did not deter inversion transactions, we believe that these findings have policy implications.
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