权力和股东显著性

Tessa Hebb, Andreas G. F. Hoepner, T. Rodionova, Imelda Sánchez
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引用次数: 1

摘要

股东行动主义对公司的运作方式产生了影响,使管理者的注意力集中在公司决策中嵌入的环境、社会和治理标准(ESG)上。然而,并非所有股东都得到管理者同样的关注。事实上,有研究表明,某些股东属性的存在是管理者关注其诉求的必要条件。有人认为,合法性是与股东显著性相关的最强属性,这一说法得到了大量定性研究的支持。我们的研究结果基于定量分析,表明权力在股东显著性中起着关键作用。与少数股东决议是在股东和公司经理之间的接触破裂时提出的假设相反,我们发现,在大多数情况下,我们同时有股东接触和一个或多个股东决议,事实上,少数股东决议继续了接触,很可能是为了获得公司的注意而需要的。尽管投资者和公司管理者的说法与此相反,但股东权力似乎仍是股东显著性的一个关键方面。本文继续询问,如果对话发生在决议提出之前,而不是在决议提出之后,是否有更大的机会与公司成功实现既定的ESG目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Power and shareholder saliency
Shareholder activism has had an impact on the way companies work, focusing the attention of managers on the environmental, social and governance standards (ESG) embedded in corporate decisions. However, not all shareholders receive the same attention from managers. In fact, there are studies showing that the existence of certain shareholder attributes are necessary for managers pay attention on their claims. It has been suggested that legitimacy is the strongest attribute associated with shareholder saliency, a claim that is backed by a considerable body of qualitative research. Our findings, based on quantitative analysis, suggest that power plays a key role in shareholder salience. Contrary to the assumption that minority shareholder resolutions are put forward when engagement between shareholders and company managers breaks down, we find that in the majority of instances where we have both shareholder engagement and one or more shareholder resolutions, that in fact the minority resolution proceeded the engagement and may well have been required in order to gain attention from the company. Despite claims to the contrary from investors and from corporate managers, it appears that shareholder power remains a key aspect in shareholder saliency. This paper goes on to ask if there is a greater chance of success in achieving the stated ESG goal with the company the dialogue occurred before the resolution was put forward rather than if the dialogue occurred after the resolution was put forward.
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