无承诺优势的委托代理关系

ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-01-31 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3798785

R. Vohra, F. Espinosa, Debraj Ray

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文探讨了在没有承诺的同时交互之外，在委托代理关系中承诺的能力不会给委托人带来额外利益的条件。一个中心假设是，委托人的收益只取决于代理人及其类型的收益。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment

This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.

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ERN: Formal & Relational Contracts Between Employers & Employees (Topic)

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