基于零售商与第三方回收商回收竞争的闭环供应链差异定价

Yan Zou, Sheng Liu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在由制造商、零售商和第三方回收商组成的闭环供应链中,考虑产品竞争和回收渠道竞争,探讨了闭环供应链的最优定价策略。分别建立了分散和集中的差异定价模型,并通过数值算例验证了所提模型的有效性和实用性。结果表明:在分散决策下,新产品和再制造产品的销售价格随着产品替代系数的增加而上升;当回收竞争弹性系数增大时,零售商和第三方回收商的回收价格上升,而制造商的回收价格保持不变。在集中决策下,零售商和第三方回收商的回收价格不受回收竞争的影响。结果还表明,产品竞争系数对供应链利润有正向影响,回收竞争弹性系数对供应链参与者的利润有负向影响,但对客户有利。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Differential Pricing of Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on Recycling Competition between Retailer and Third-party Recycler
In a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler, this work takes into account both products competition and recycling channels competition to explore the optimal pricing strategy of the CLSC. It builds the decentralized and centralized differential pricing models respectively, and the numerical examples are conducted to verify the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed models. The results show that under the decentralized decision, the sale price of new products and remanufactured products rises with the increase of product substitution coefficient; when the recycling competitive elasticity coefficient increases, the recycling prices of retailer and third-party recycler rise while the manufacturer's recycling price remains unchanged. Under centralized decision, the recycling prices of retailers and third-party recyclers are not affected by recycling competition. The results also show that the product competition coefficient has a positive impact on the supply chain profit, and the recycling competitive elasticity coefficient has a negative impact on the profit of supply chain participants but benefits customers.
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