{"title":"伯克利和斯宾诺莎","authors":"S. Daniel","doi":"10.3917/RPHI.101.0123","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. This chapter focuses on how Berkeley’s comments on the Arnauld–Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality, and on his treatment of God’s creation of finite minds within nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza.","PeriodicalId":268491,"journal":{"name":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Berkeley and Spinoza\",\"authors\":\"S. Daniel\",\"doi\":\"10.3917/RPHI.101.0123\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. This chapter focuses on how Berkeley’s comments on the Arnauld–Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality, and on his treatment of God’s creation of finite minds within nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza.\",\"PeriodicalId\":268491,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-02-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.101.0123\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"George Berkeley and Early Modern Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3917/RPHI.101.0123","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
There is a widespread assumption that Berkeley and Spinoza have little in common, even though early Jesuit critics in France often linked them. Later commentators have also recognized their similarities. This chapter focuses on how Berkeley’s comments on the Arnauld–Malebranche debate regarding objective and formal reality, and on his treatment of God’s creation of finite minds within nature relate his theory of knowledge to his doctrine in a way similar to that of Spinoza.