公平划分满足车辆路径:单调利润驾驶员的公平性

2022 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV) Pub Date : 2022-06-05 DOI:10.1109/IV51971.2022.9827432

M. Aleksandrov

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一种新的公平分配和车辆路径模型，其中驾驶员具有单调的利润偏好，并且他们的车辆具有可行性约束，以满足客户的要求。对于这个模型，我们设计了两个新的公理化概念:FEQ1和FEF1。FEQ1编码驱动对有界公平性。FEF1编码驱动对有界嫉妒度。我们将FEQ1和FEF1与流行的公平划分概念(如EQ1和EF1)进行比较。并分别给出了保证FEQ1和FEF1的算法。

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Fair Division meets Vehicle Routing: Fairness for Drivers with Monotone Profits

We propose a new model for fair division and vehicle routing, where drivers have monotone profit preferences, and their vehicles have feasibility constraints, for customer requests. For this model, we design two new axiomatic notions for fairness for drivers: FEQ1 and FEF1. FEQ1 encodes driver pairwise bounded equitability. FEF1 encodes driver pairwise bounded envy freeness. We compare FEQ1 and FEF1 with popular fair division notions such as EQ1 and EF1. We also give algorithms for guaranteeing FEQ1 and FEF1, respectively.

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来源期刊

2022 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV)

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