结论

T. Fowler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

这本书的核心论点是,孩子们应该有一个良好的成长环境,成年人应该有稳定和支持的权利来照顾孩子,如果他们愿意的话。在第一部分中,我探讨了如何概念化儿童正义,以及如何衡量儿童的利益是否得到了社会的满足。我展示了为什么儿童的兴趣不能从拥有一组资源的角度来理解,即使资源是在非常广泛的意义上被理解的。当正义的主体被理解为成年人时,那么正义原则的作用仅仅是给予每个人公平的份额就说得通了。这是上个世纪两位最有影响力的自由主义思想家约翰•罗尔斯和罗纳德•德沃金所持的观点。我认为他们的做法不能满足儿童的需要,因为儿童可能拥有公平份额的经济资源,但在成长过程中,他们的信仰、价值观和做法可能会对他们当前和未来的繁荣有害。因此,正义理论必须全面考虑教育可能影响一个人的生活的各种方式,从而研究其对儿童福祉的影响。为了应对这一挑战,我提供了一个关于儿童幸福的客观清单,表明这主要是由他们与他人关系的质量驱动的。这一理论转变意味着对正义的重新概念化。正义不应主要被理解为经济公平,而必须从根本上被视为建立一个具有促进人际关系繁荣的规范和做法的社会,特别关注必须优先考虑其利益的最弱势儿童....
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Conclusion
The central arguments of this book have been that children are owed a good environment in which to grow up and that adults are owed the stable and supported right to care for children if they so desire. In Part I, I explored how to conceptualize children’s justice and how to measure whether children’s interests are being met by their society. I showed why children’s interests cannot be understood in terms of holding a set of resources, even if resources are understood in a very broad sense. When the subject of justice is understood to be adults, then it makes sense that the role of principles of justice simply be giving each person their fair share. This was the perspective taken by the two most influential liberal thinkers of the last century, John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. I suggested their approach cannot cope with the needs of children, since children might have a fair share of economic resources yet grow up socialized into beliefs, values and practices that are harmful to their current and future flourishing. A theory of justice must, therefore, take holistic account of the various ways in which upbringing might affect a person’s life, thus looking at its effects on children’s well-being. To meet this challenge, I offered an objective list account of children’s well-being which suggested that this is principally driven by the quality of their relationships with others. This theoretical shift implies a reconceptualization of what justice is about. Instead of justice being understood primarily as economic fairness, it must be seen as fundamentally about creating a society with norms and practice which foster flourishing interpersonal relationships, with a particular concern for the least advantaged children whose interests must be given priority....
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