收购中的投标人折扣和目标溢价

ERN: Integration (Topic) Pub Date : 2002-06-01 DOI:10.1257/000282804322970698

Boyan Jovanovic, Serguey Braguinsky

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引用次数: 154

摘要

当一项收购被宣布时，相关公司的股票市场价值总和通常会下降，而收购方的价值几乎总是会下降。这是否意味着收购不会提高相关公司的价值?不一定。我们建立了一个模型，其中收购的均衡数量是有效的。然而，一旦有收购的消息传出，目标公司的价格就会上涨，而出价方的价格则会下跌，而且在大多数情况下，目标公司和收购方的共同价值也会下跌。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Bidder Discounts and Target Premia in Takeovers

When a takeover is announced, the sum of the stock-market values of the firms involved often falls, and the value of the acquirer almost always does. Does this mean that takeovers do not raise the values of the firms involved? Not necessarily. We set up a model in which the equilibrium number of takeovers is constrained efficient. Yet, upon news of a takeover, a target's price rises, the bidder's price falls, and, most of the time the joint value of the target and acquirer also falls.

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ERN: Integration (Topic)

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