网络物理系统隐蔽通道攻击的基于网络的机器学习检测

Hongwei Li, D. Chasaki
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引用次数: 2

摘要

最近大多数针对网络物理系统(CPS)的高调攻击都是从长时间的侦察开始的,这使得攻击者能够深入了解受害者的环境。为了模拟这些隐形攻击,已经发布了一些隐蔽通道工具,并证明它们能够有效地融入现有的CPS通信流,并具有数据泄露和命令注入的能力。在本文中,我们报告了一种新的机器学习特征工程和数据处理管道,用于检测具有实时检测吞吐量的CPS系统的隐蔽通道攻击。该系统还可以在网络层运行,而不需要物理系统特定领域的状态建模,例如发电系统中的电压水平。我们不仅证明了使用TCP有效载荷熵作为工程特征和将信息分组到网络流中的技术的有效性,而且还将所提出的检测器用于采用高级逃避策略的场景,并且仍然达到99%以上的检测性能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Network-Based Machine Learning Detection of Covert Channel Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Most of the recent high-profile attacks targeting cyber-physical systems (CPS) started with lengthy reconnaissance periods that enabled attackers to gain in-depth understanding of the victim’s environment. To simulate these stealthy attacks, several covert channel tools have been published and proven effective in their ability to blend into existing CPS communication streams and have the capability for data exfiltration and command injection.In this paper, we report a novel machine learning feature engineering and data processing pipeline for the detection of covert channel attacks on CPS systems with real-time detection throughput. The system also operates at the network layer without requiring physical system domain-specific state modeling, such as voltage levels in a power generation system. We not only demonstrate the effectiveness of using TCP payload entropy as engineered features and the technique of grouping information into network flows, but also pitch the proposed detector against scenarios employing advanced evasion tactics, and still achieve above 99% detection performance.
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