对美国的影响

L. S. Kaplan
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引用次数: 9

摘要

对美国来说,中国的军售是一个重大问题,尽管可以控制。北京方面的转让增加了无赖国家的实力和自主权,并有助于导弹和NBC系统的传播,尽管北京近年来对无赖国家的支持有所减少,在与NBC相关的转让中更加负责任。尽管有了这些改善,在中国的行为停止对美国利益构成威胁之前,还需要进一步的进展。我们的分析支持了有关中国军售行为的三个重要发现。首先,声称中国武器转让主要是出于产生出口收入的愿望是不准确的。事实上,中国几乎所有的武器转让至少在一定程度上是出于外交政策考虑,军售收入对北京的重要性正在下降。其次,有关中国中央政府控制武器转让的能力有限的说法也是不准确的。中国的武器出口系统实际上是相当集中的,最敏感的整套系统的转让需要中央军委成员的批准——相当于需要美国参谋长联席会议或国家安全委员会成员的批准。从美国的角度来看,第三个结论更为积极:中国对国际防扩散准则的遵守实际上正在增加。自1992年以来,中国加入了若干国际防扩散机制,包括不扩散______________ 1请注意,本声明仅适用于完整的武器系统,不适用于军民两用材料和设备。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Implications for the United States
China's arms sales are a significant, though manageable, problem for the United States. Beijing's transfers have increased the strength and autonomy of pariah states and helped missile and NBC systems spread, although Beijing in recent years has been less supportive of pariah states and more responsible in its NBC-related transfers. Despite these improvements, further progress is necessary before China's behavior stops posing a threat to U.S. interests. Our analysis supports three significant findings about China's arms sales behavior. First, the claim that China's arms transfers are motivated primarily by the desire to generate export earnings is inaccurate. In fact, virtually all of China's arms transfers are at least partly driven by foreign policy considerations, and revenues from arms sales are of diminishing importance to Beijing. Second, the related claim that China's central government has only a limited ability to control arms transfers is also inaccurate. China's weapons export system is in fact quite centralized, with the most sensitive transfers of complete systems requiring the approval of a member of the Central Military Commission—comparable to requiring the approval of a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council. 1 The third conclusion is more positive from a U.S. perspective: China's adherence to international nonproliferation norms is in fact increasing. China has joined several international nonproliferation regimes since 1992, including the Non-Proliferation ______________ 1 Note that this statement applies only to complete weapon systems, not dual-use materials and equipment.
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