{"title":"对美国的影响","authors":"L. S. Kaplan","doi":"10.1080/01440389108403972","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"China's arms sales are a significant, though manageable, problem for the United States. Beijing's transfers have increased the strength and autonomy of pariah states and helped missile and NBC systems spread, although Beijing in recent years has been less supportive of pariah states and more responsible in its NBC-related transfers. Despite these improvements, further progress is necessary before China's behavior stops posing a threat to U.S. interests. Our analysis supports three significant findings about China's arms sales behavior. First, the claim that China's arms transfers are motivated primarily by the desire to generate export earnings is inaccurate. In fact, virtually all of China's arms transfers are at least partly driven by foreign policy considerations, and revenues from arms sales are of diminishing importance to Beijing. Second, the related claim that China's central government has only a limited ability to control arms transfers is also inaccurate. China's weapons export system is in fact quite centralized, with the most sensitive transfers of complete systems requiring the approval of a member of the Central Military Commission—comparable to requiring the approval of a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council. 1 The third conclusion is more positive from a U.S. perspective: China's adherence to international nonproliferation norms is in fact increasing. China has joined several international nonproliferation regimes since 1992, including the Non-Proliferation ______________ 1 Note that this statement applies only to complete weapon systems, not dual-use materials and equipment.","PeriodicalId":362044,"journal":{"name":"European Security without the Soviet Union","volume":"167 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1991-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Implications for the United States\",\"authors\":\"L. S. Kaplan\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/01440389108403972\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"China's arms sales are a significant, though manageable, problem for the United States. Beijing's transfers have increased the strength and autonomy of pariah states and helped missile and NBC systems spread, although Beijing in recent years has been less supportive of pariah states and more responsible in its NBC-related transfers. Despite these improvements, further progress is necessary before China's behavior stops posing a threat to U.S. interests. Our analysis supports three significant findings about China's arms sales behavior. First, the claim that China's arms transfers are motivated primarily by the desire to generate export earnings is inaccurate. In fact, virtually all of China's arms transfers are at least partly driven by foreign policy considerations, and revenues from arms sales are of diminishing importance to Beijing. Second, the related claim that China's central government has only a limited ability to control arms transfers is also inaccurate. China's weapons export system is in fact quite centralized, with the most sensitive transfers of complete systems requiring the approval of a member of the Central Military Commission—comparable to requiring the approval of a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council. 1 The third conclusion is more positive from a U.S. perspective: China's adherence to international nonproliferation norms is in fact increasing. China has joined several international nonproliferation regimes since 1992, including the Non-Proliferation ______________ 1 Note that this statement applies only to complete weapon systems, not dual-use materials and equipment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":362044,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Security without the Soviet Union\",\"volume\":\"167 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1991-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Security without the Soviet Union\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/01440389108403972\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Security without the Soviet Union","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01440389108403972","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
China's arms sales are a significant, though manageable, problem for the United States. Beijing's transfers have increased the strength and autonomy of pariah states and helped missile and NBC systems spread, although Beijing in recent years has been less supportive of pariah states and more responsible in its NBC-related transfers. Despite these improvements, further progress is necessary before China's behavior stops posing a threat to U.S. interests. Our analysis supports three significant findings about China's arms sales behavior. First, the claim that China's arms transfers are motivated primarily by the desire to generate export earnings is inaccurate. In fact, virtually all of China's arms transfers are at least partly driven by foreign policy considerations, and revenues from arms sales are of diminishing importance to Beijing. Second, the related claim that China's central government has only a limited ability to control arms transfers is also inaccurate. China's weapons export system is in fact quite centralized, with the most sensitive transfers of complete systems requiring the approval of a member of the Central Military Commission—comparable to requiring the approval of a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council. 1 The third conclusion is more positive from a U.S. perspective: China's adherence to international nonproliferation norms is in fact increasing. China has joined several international nonproliferation regimes since 1992, including the Non-Proliferation ______________ 1 Note that this statement applies only to complete weapon systems, not dual-use materials and equipment.