Monodeep Kar, Arvind Singh, S. Mathew, Anand Rajan, V. De, S. Mukhopadhyay
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Exploiting Fully Integrated Inductive Voltage Regulators to Improve Side Channel Resistance of Encryption Engines
This paper explores fully integrated inductive voltage regulators (FIVR) as a technique to improve the side channel resistance of encryption engines. We propose security aware design modes for low passive FIVR to improve robustness of an encryption-engine against statistical power attacks in time and frequency domain. A Correlation Power Analysis is used to attack a 128-bit AES engine synthesized in 130nm CMOS. The original design requires ~250 Measurements to Disclose (MTD) the 1st byte of key; but with security-aware FIVR, the CPA was unsuccessful even after 20,000 traces. We present a reversibility based threat model for the FIVR-based protection improvement and show the robustness of security aware FIVR against such threat.