将生殖权利(和司法)宪法化

Melissa E. Murray, Hilarie Meyers
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摘要

在格里斯沃尔德诉康涅狄格州案和罗伊诉韦德案中,美国最高法院围绕隐私权为生殖权利制定了宪法保护。但最高法院对隐私的强调并非不可避免。相反,在20世纪60年代和70年代,反对禁止避孕和堕胎的法律的倡导者提供了广泛的宪法依据,其中包括种族,阶级和性别不平等的主张。然而,主流的生殖权利组织在他们的倡导工作中重申了格里斯沃尔德和罗伊的隐私逻辑,进一步巩固了隐私、个人选择和消极权利的修辞。然而,当地的倡导者试图恢复对种族,性别和阶级不平等的关注,这些问题以前标志着生殖权利的倡导,到20世纪90年代,生殖正义运动已经成为传统生殖权利框架的对位。随着时间的推移,生殖正义运动的交叉要素已经渗透到主流生殖权利倡导中,扩大了生殖权利话语的范围和范围。但关键的是,随着生殖正义的各个方面被纳入主流的生殖权利话语,那些反对生殖权利的人——从反堕胎团体到最高法院的成员——都试图利用生殖正义运动的言论来达到自己的目的。这种新的保守主义话语并没有将堕胎和避孕视为女性平等的必要条件,而是认为生殖权利根植于种族、性别、阶级和残疾的不平等和不公正,并发挥着工具的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Constitutionalizing Reproductive Rights (and Justice)
In Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court framed constitutional protections for reproductive rights around the right to privacy. But the Court’s emphasis on privacy was not inevitable. Rather, in the 1960s and 1970s, advocates challenging laws prohibiting contraception and abortion offered a wide range of constitutional grounds in which to root reproductive freedom, including claims of race, class, and sex inequality. Nevertheless, mainstream reproductive rights groups reiterated Griswold and Roe’s privacy logic in their advocacy efforts, further entrenching the rhetoric of privacy, individual choice, and negative rights. However, advocates on the ground sought to recuperate the concerns of race, sex, and class inequality that had previously marked reproductive rights advocacy, and by the 1990s, the reproductive justice movement had emerged as a counterpoint to the traditional reproductive rights framework. Over time, the intersectional elements of the reproductive justice movement have infiltrated mainstream reproductive rights advocacy, widening the range and scope of reproductive rights discourse. But critically, as aspects of reproductive justice have been integrated into mainstream reproductive rights discourse, those opposed to reproductive rights—from antiabortion groups to members of the Supreme Court—have sought to coopt the reproductive justice movement’s rhetoric for their own purposes. Rather than viewing access to abortion and contraception as essential to women’s equality, this new conservative discourse argues that reproductive rights are rooted in, and function as, tools of, race, sex, class, and disability-based inequality and injustice.
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