顶端交易周期机制的合理嫉妒最小变异

Jian Hong, Qianfeng Tang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Abdulkadiroglu等人(2019)表明,当每个对象只有一个副本时,基于优先级的不可分割对象分配给具有单位需求的代理,基于优先级的顶级交易周期机制是合理嫉妒最小的,从某种意义上说,没有任何策略证明和帕累托有效机制的合理嫉妒比它严格少。是否存在一种独特的合理的嫉妒最小机制仍然是一个未知数。我们提出了顶部交易周期机制的策略证明和帕累托有效变异,并证明了它也是合理的嫉妒最小值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Justified Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
For priority-based allocation of indivisible objects to agents with unit demand, when each object has exactly one copy, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2019) show that the priority-based top trading cycles mechanism is justified envy minimal, in the sense that no strategy proof and Pareto efficient mechanism has strictly less justified envy than it. It remains open whether there is a unique justified envy minimal mechanism. We propose a strategy proof and Pareto efficient variation of the top trading cycles mechanism and show that it is also justified envy minimal.
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