高精度GNSS接收机中多层欺骗检测的演示

A. Broumandan, S. Kennedy, J. Schleppe
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引用次数: 3

摘要

包括车辆导航、电网和数字通信网络在内的民用应用都依赖于基于gnss的位置和授时服务,破坏这些系统并危及生命安全和关键应用的动机有所增加。由于GNSS信号在地球表面附近较弱,容易受到干扰和欺骗攻击。本文将描述真实的欺骗场景及其特征。这种表征是基于欺骗/真实相对信号功率、欺骗信号与真实信号的同步程度以及欺骗和真实信号的可用性。定义了多种检测方法,使用在具有单个天线输入的GNSS接收器的不同层导出的度量。在NovAtel的OEM7系列接收机上实现了机载欺骗检测单元。该单元从GNSS信号处理链中收集不同的指标,并在接收器受到欺骗攻击时提供实时指示。在干扰或多路径条件下,会特别考虑错误检测的可能性,因为错误地声明存在欺骗攻击可能会导致用户或欺骗缓解实现产生不正确、不必要甚至危险的反应。但是,如果存在欺骗信号,用户(和接收器)必须意识到这些信号,以选择适当的操作过程。测试结果采用基于GNSS硬件模拟器、中继器和软件定义无线电的几种欺骗场景,从静止到运动,具有低和高水平的多径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demonstration of a Multi-Layer Spoofing Detection Implemented in a High Precision GNSS Receiver
Civilian applications including vehicular navigation, electrical power grids and digital communication networks are relying on GNSS-based position and timing services and motivation has increased to disrupt these systems and endanger safety of life and critical applications. GNSS signals are susceptible to jamming and spoofing attacks due to being weak near the earth's surface. Herein, realistic spoofing scenarios and their features will be characterized. This characterization is based on spoofing/authentic relative signal power, how synchronous the spoofing signals are to the authentic ones and the availability of both spoofing and authentic signals. A variety of detection methods are defined, using metrics derived at different layers of a GNSS receiver with a single antenna input. An on-board spoofing detection unit was implemented on NovAtel's OEM7 family of receivers. This unit collects different metrics from the GNSS signal processing chain and provides a real-time indication if the receiver is under spoofing attack. The probability of false detection during jamming or multipath conditions is given special consideration, since a false declaration of the presence of a spoofing attack could lead to incorrect, unnecessary or even dangerous reactions from the user or spoofing mitigation implementations. However, if spoofing signals are present, the user (and the receiver) must be aware of these to choose an appropriate course of action. Test results are presented using several spoofing scenarios based on GNSS hardware simulator, repeaters and software defined radios in conditions ranging from stationary to kinematic, with low and high levels of multipath.
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