{"title":"法律解释中的道义可推翻推理:模拟解释论证的两种选择","authors":"A. Rotolo, Guido Governatori, G. Sartor","doi":"10.1145/2746090.2746100","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper offers a new logical machinery for reasoning about interpretive canons. We identify some options for modelling reasoning about interpretations and show that interpretative argumentation has a distinctive structure where the claim that a legal text ought or may be interpreted in a certain way can be supported or attacked by arguments, whose conflicts may have to be assessed according to further arguments.","PeriodicalId":309125,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"35","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Deontic defeasible reasoning in legal interpretation: two options for modelling interpretive arguments\",\"authors\":\"A. Rotolo, Guido Governatori, G. Sartor\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2746090.2746100\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper offers a new logical machinery for reasoning about interpretive canons. We identify some options for modelling reasoning about interpretations and show that interpretative argumentation has a distinctive structure where the claim that a legal text ought or may be interpreted in a certain way can be supported or attacked by arguments, whose conflicts may have to be assessed according to further arguments.\",\"PeriodicalId\":309125,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-06-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"35\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746090.2746100\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2746090.2746100","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Deontic defeasible reasoning in legal interpretation: two options for modelling interpretive arguments
This paper offers a new logical machinery for reasoning about interpretive canons. We identify some options for modelling reasoning about interpretations and show that interpretative argumentation has a distinctive structure where the claim that a legal text ought or may be interpreted in a certain way can be supported or attacked by arguments, whose conflicts may have to be assessed according to further arguments.