波音公司薪酬委员会在判断737 Max的商业风险时是否足够独立?

Dov Fischer, D. Augustine, Ngoc Cindy Pham
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引用次数: 3

摘要

波音公司2011年推出737 Max对该公司来说是一个灾难性的决定,甚至可能威胁到其长期生存能力。在2011年致股东的信中,这位首席执行官表示,此举将“在未来十年大幅降低我们的业务风险”。这位首席执行官还说服他的薪酬委员会在衡量经济利润和公司绩效评分时考虑“降低风险”的因素。因此,CEO的薪酬从2011年前两年的不到2,000万美元涨到了2011年后三年的逾2,600万美元。巧合的是,这位首席执行官是通用电气的资深员工,薪酬委员会的四名成员中有两名也是。本案例研究表明,管理层可以控制薪酬委员会,并实施可能损害公司长期利益的薪酬激励措施。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Was Boeing’s Compensation Committee Sufficiently Independent in Judging the Business Risk of the 737 Max?
Boeing’s 2011 launch of the 737 Max has been a disastrous decision for the company and could even threaten its long-term viability. In the 2011 letter to shareholder, the CEO said it will “reduce our business risk substantially for the next decade.” The CEO also convinced his compensation committee to factor “risk reduction” into its measure of economic profit and company performance score. Consequently, CEO pay rose from less than $20 million in the two years preceding 2011, to over $26 million in the three years after 2011. Coincidentally, the CEO was a long-term veteran of General Electric, as were two of the four members of the compensation committee. This case study illustrates that management can capture the compensation committee and put into place compensation incentives that can harm the company in the long-run.
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