第三方错误的影响

A. Shastitko
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引用次数: 2

摘要

从规则执行的角度和垂直向上到规则制定的角度来看,第一类和第二类错误的影响都很重要。本文支持传统观点,即两种错误对威慑都有不利影响。同时,基于第三方执法支持的经济交换参与者之间的战略互动,证明了类型1错误的特殊作用,并提供了歧视参与者的机会。本文强调了执行错误并非全部的问题,建议从规则执行和规则制定中的第一类和第二类错误的角度对案例进行简单分类。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Effects of the Third Party Errors
Type-I and type-II errors effects do matter both from the rules enforcement perspective and vertically upward to rules enactment. The paper support conventional idea about detrimental influence on deterrence of both types of errors. At the same time special role of type-I errors is demonstrated based on strategic interaction between economic exchange participants supported by third-party enforcement with opportunities to discriminate players. The paper highlights the issue that errors in enforcement is not whole story: the simple classification of cases is suggested from the perspective of type-I and type-II errors in rules enforcement and rules enactment.
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