PC上的Android:终端用户Android模拟器的安全性研究

Fenghao Xu, Siyu Shen, Wenrui Diao, Zhou Li, Yi Chen, Rui Li, Kehuan Zhang
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引用次数: 4

摘要

今天的Android模拟器不仅是开发人员的调试工具,而且还服务于大量的终端用户。这些终端用户Android模拟器吸引了数以百万计的用户,因为它们具有在台式机上运行移动应用的优势,对那些需要更大屏幕和更好性能的手机游戏玩家尤其有吸引力。此外,他们通常会提供一些定制的辅助功能来改善用户体验,例如键盘映射和主机安装应用程序。为了实现这些服务,模拟器不可避免地引入了主机操作系统和Android操作系统(在虚拟机中)之间的通信通道,从而形成了手机所不具备的独特架构。然而,尚不清楚这种体系结构是否会给模拟器带来任何新的安全风险。本文对终端用户Android仿真器进行了系统研究,发现其在通信通道认证、权限控制、开放接口等方面存在一系列安全漏洞。攻击者可以利用这些漏洞绕过Android安全机制,并在模拟器中升级他们的特权,最终侵犯用户隐私,例如窃取有价值的游戏账户和凭证。为了理解我们的发现的影响,我们研究了六个流行的模拟器并测量了它们的缺陷。结果表明,这些问题普遍存在,并可能导致严重的安全后果。我们相信我们的工作只是冰山一角,进一步的研究可以提高这个生态系统的安全性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Android on PC: On the Security of End-user Android Emulators
Android emulators today are not only acting as a debugging tool for developers but also serving the massive end-users. These end-user Android emulators have attracted millions of users due to their advantages of running mobile apps on desktops and are especially appealing for mobile game players who demand larger screens and better performance. Besides, they commonly provide some customized assistant functionalities to improve the user experience, such as keyboard mapping and app installation from the host. To implement these services, emulators inevitably introduce communication channels between host OS and Android OS (in the Virtual Machine), thus forming a unique architecture which mobile phone does not have. However, it is unknown whether this architecture brings any new security risks to emulators. This paper performed a systematic study on end-user Android emulators and discovered a series of security flaws on communication channel authentication, permission control, and open interfaces. Attackers could exploit these flaws to bypass Android security mechanisms and escalate their privileges inside emulators, ultimately invading users' privacy, such as stealing valuable game accounts and credentials. To understand the impact of our findings, we studied six popular emulators and measured their flaws. The results showed that the issues are pervasive and could cause severe security consequences. We believe our work just shows the tip of the iceberg, and further research can be done to improve the security of this ecosystem.
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