结束企业避税与税收竞争:跨国公司税收赤字的征收计划

K. Clausing, Emmanuel Saez, G. Zucman
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引用次数: 30

摘要

1985年至2019年期间,全球平均法定企业税率从49%降至23%,主要原因是国际税收竞争加剧。全球化的最大赢家减税幅度最大。在本文中,我们提出了一种解决方案,将这种逐底竞争替换为逐顶竞争。跨国公司在某些国家的有效税率较低(我们称之为“税收赤字”),将在其本国支付额外的税。我们将解释这种税应该如何设计以及如何征收。理想的解决方案是所有国家共同开始征收跨国公司的税收赤字。我们描述了如何对拒绝参与此类协议的国家采取防御性措施,这些措施最终可能为全球企业税收协调铺平道路。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ending Corporate Tax Avoidance and Tax Competition: A Plan to Collect the Tax Deficit of Multinationals
Between 1985 and 2019, the global average statutory corporate tax rate has fallen from 49 percent to 23 percent, largely due to the rise of international tax competition. The biggest winners from globalization have received the largest tax cuts. In this paper we propose a solution to replace this race-to-the-bottom with a race-to-the-top. Multinational companies that have low effective tax rates in some foreign countries (what we call a “tax deficit”) would pay an extra tax in their home country. We explain how such a tax should be designed and how it could be collected. The ideal solution would be for all countries to jointly start collecting the tax deficit of their multinationals. We describe how defensive measures could be applied against countries refusing to take part in such an agreement, measures that could ultimately pave the way to global corporate tax coordination.
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