福利改革的意外后果:离婚父母的案例

Marco Francesconi, Helmut Rainer, Wilbert van der Klaauw
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文建立了一个模型来考察税收优惠政策的变化对离异父母行为和单亲家庭儿童福利的影响。无监护权的父母可以选择转移给监护人的子女抚养费水平。这些因素反过来又决定了儿童福利支出以及市场工作和养育子女之间的时间分配。一般来说,前配偶不能有效地分配他们的资源。在托管方面,劳动力供给水平低得没有效率,儿童用品支出水平低得没有效率,而在非托管方面,儿童抚养费则低得次优。我们的研究结果合理化了福利改革可能对离婚父母及其子女产生的不利影响。这种不利影响的产生,可能是因为托管人的有效工资的增加,无论是通过降低边际所得税率还是提高托儿补贴,都加剧了离婚父母决策的低效率:也就是说,这种增加进一步抑制了从无监护权父母那里转移子女抚养费的行为,并促使有监护权的父母更加努力地工作。我们探索了这个模型的几个扩展,将我们的发现与现有的关于福利改革影响的实证文献联系起来,并讨论了我们的结果对政策和进一步的经济分析的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: The Case of Divorced Parents
This paper formulates a model to examine the effects of changes in tax-benefit policy on the behavior of divorced parents and the well-being of children in single-parent households. Noncustodial parents choose the level of a child support payment to transfer to custodians. These, in turn, decide over child good expenditures and the allocation of time between market work and parenting. In general, ex-spouses fail to achieve an efficient allocation of their resources. On the custodial side, there are inefficiently high levels of labor supply and inefficiently low levels of expenditures on child goods, while on the noncustodial side child support payments are suboptimally low. Our results rationalize the adverse effects that welfare reforms might have on divorced parents and their children. Such adverse effects may arise because an increase in the custodian's effective wage, either through lower marginal income tax rates or higher childcare subsidies, reinforces the inefficiencies of divorced parents' decisions: that is, such an increase further depresses child support transfers from noncustodial parents and induces custodial parents to work even more. We explore several extensions of this model, link our findings to the existing empirical literature on the impacts of welfare reform, and discuss the implications of our results for policy and further economic analysis.
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