南非股市是否重视独立的双董事会领导结构?

C. Ntim
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引用次数: 10

摘要

我们研究了南非(SA)股票市场是否重视双董事会领导结构(DBLS)的关键政策问题,使用2002年至2007年169家上市公司的样本。我们发现,独立董事长与市场估值之间存在显著的正相关关系,但仅在拥有独立董事长的公司中存在,这意味着市场对拥有独立董事长的公司的估值更高。我们的结果在控制不同类型的市场估值代理和内生性问题的许多计量经济模型中都是稳健的。我们的研究结果为代理理论提供了实证支持,该理论认为,独立的DBLS增加了董事会有效建议、监督和约束高管的能力,从而提高了市场估值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does the South African Stock Market Values Independent Dual Board Leadership Structure?
We examine the crucial policy question of whether the South African (SA) stock market values a dual board leadership structure (DBLS) using a sample of 169 listed firms from 2002 to 2007. We find a significant positive link between DBLS and market valuation, but only in firms with independent chairpersons, implying that the market values firms with independent DBLS more highly. Our results are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of market valuation proxies and endogeneity problems. Our findings offer empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that independent DBLS increases the capacity of the board to effectively advise, monitor and discipline top management, and thereby improving market valuation.
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