EMBODIMENT AND THE INNER LIFE: A RESPONSE TO MY REVIEWERS

First, I would like to thank all the reviewers for taking the time and trouble to read and comment on my book, as well as opening up many interesting areas for discussion and debate. This has highlighted various ways in which the book could perhaps have been more clear. I am also grateful for the opportunity to respond. Many of the reviewers have said complementary and supportive things. I have little to say in reply to the useful and (mostly) kind reviews by Franklin, Kuipers, and Montandon and Baars, or to the constructive criticisms of Beaudoin, or to Haikonen, whose work on cognitive architecture is (I think) quite compatible with my own, except to thank them for all their attention. So the response that follows will focus on the critical points that were highlighted by other authors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most controversial portion of the book seems to be the opening chapter, where I make my stand on philosophical matters. So, let us begin there. According to Manzotti, the book displays \contempt for. . .metaphysical attitudes". I am not sure to what extent the word \contempt" was intended here to carry its full load of negative valence, but it is worth counteracting this impression. I respect metaphysics, as a climber respects a great mountain. I am irresistably drawn to it. I fear it. (Thinking about the mind-body problem can drive you to the edge of madness.) Contempt is not the right word for such an adversary. When Harnad anticipates that I will accuse him of having \not been su±ciently postre°ective" to overcome his metaphysical tendencies, he is absolutely right. But I would hesitate to claim the required level of post-re°ective calm myself. I am still troubled by metaphysical thinking. However, I do have an inkling of what might lie beyond it. The post-re°ective standpoint is not committed to the view that, as