收入游戏

Marc Hodak
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引用次数: 11

摘要

盈利游戏指的是公司高管和投资界在评估和沟通公司财务业绩时的舞蹈。投资者不断评估他们所拥有或希望拥有的企业的前景。收益公告为这些评估提供了关键的数据点,因为它们反映了公司自己根据合理的标准提供的具体数据,这些标准可以将公司的业绩与过去和同行进行比较。知道盈利数据对投资界的重要性,导致公司经理对其披露非常谨慎。经理们通常希望显示出不断增长的收入,并尽量减少对未来收入的不确定性,他们相应地管理他们的业务和报告。通常,这种管理的一部分涉及通过肯定或反对投资者的预期来对分析师的收益预测做出反应。投资界自然理解管理层的动机,在评估公司提供的信息的同时,必须考虑到管理层的可信度。反过来,管理层必须在每一次发布中培养他们在投资界的信誉。下面的案例让参与者理解舞蹈双方的动机和反应。它将参与者置于具有一定激励和约束的各种角色中,并允许所有参与者以与其各自动机一致的方式进行互动。虽然这种情况必然简化了公司管理层和投资分析师之间的关系,但它唤起了公司在管理和评估公司收益方面的相关行为及其情感内容。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Earnings Game
The Earnings Game refers to the dance between corporate officers and the investment community in the evaluation and communications of corporate financial performance.Investors continually evaluate the prospects of businesses they own or wish to own. Earnings announcements provide critical data points in those evaluations because they reflect concrete figures provided by the companies themselves according to standards that reasonably enable comparisons of company performance to its past and peers.Knowing the importance of earnings data to the investment community causes corporate managers to be very cautious about its disclosure. Managers generally want to show growing earnings, and to minimize uncertainty about future earnings, and they manage their businesses and their reporting accordingly. Often, part of this management involves reacting to analyst earnings projections by affirming or confronting investor expectations. The investment community, naturally, understands management's motivation and must account for management credibility at the same time they evaluate company-provided information. Management, in turn, must nurture their credibility with the investment community with each release.The following case engages participants to understand the motivations and reactions of both sides of this dance. It places participants in various roles with certain incentives and constraints, and allows all participants to interact in a manner consistent with their respective motivations. While this case necessarily simplifies the relationship between corporate management and investment analysts, it evokes both the relevant behaviors and their emotional content in the management and evaluation of companies with respect to their earnings.
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