{"title":"信贷软预算约束与目标差异","authors":"H. Lei, Shihua Wang","doi":"10.1109/ISISE.2010.114","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"From the relevant interest game, this article establishes a tripartite game model involving enterprise, bank and government to analyze their behavior and their goal difference of how to influence the enterprise credit default. The model shows that for political and economic interests, the government implements the soft budget constraint to enterprise repayment through subsidies to bank and enterprise.","PeriodicalId":206833,"journal":{"name":"2010 Third International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Credit Soft Budget Constraint and the Goal Difference\",\"authors\":\"H. Lei, Shihua Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ISISE.2010.114\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"From the relevant interest game, this article establishes a tripartite game model involving enterprise, bank and government to analyze their behavior and their goal difference of how to influence the enterprise credit default. The model shows that for political and economic interests, the government implements the soft budget constraint to enterprise repayment through subsidies to bank and enterprise.\",\"PeriodicalId\":206833,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2010 Third International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering\",\"volume\":\"120 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-12-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2010 Third International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISISE.2010.114\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2010 Third International Symposium on Information Science and Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ISISE.2010.114","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Credit Soft Budget Constraint and the Goal Difference
From the relevant interest game, this article establishes a tripartite game model involving enterprise, bank and government to analyze their behavior and their goal difference of how to influence the enterprise credit default. The model shows that for political and economic interests, the government implements the soft budget constraint to enterprise repayment through subsidies to bank and enterprise.
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