调节董事职责:澳大利亚公司法民事处罚制裁的效果如何?

G. Gilligan, H. Bird, I. Ramsay
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引用次数: 5

摘要

该研究项目考察了澳大利亚证券和投资委员会(ASIC)如何使用民事处罚作为对公司董事的执法工具。它确定并批判性地评估影响ASIC关于民事处罚的执法决定的因素。该研究采用的方法包括收集有关民事处罚使用的数据,以及对来自澳大利亚各地区域办事处的ASIC高级执法人员进行一系列半结构化访谈。受访人员包括:国家执法主任;区域专员;执法区域主任;区域助理署长(执法);和区域总法律顾问。联邦议会于1993年提出了民事处罚,期望它们将成为一项重要的执法工具。1998年7月1日,联邦议会将《公司法》规定的民事处罚的适用范围扩大到一些额外的法定条款,包括涉及股份资本交易和管理管理投资计划的条款。然而,我们的研究发现,自1993年引入民事处罚以来,ASIC仅启动了涉及10个案件的14项民事处罚申请。该研究发现了一些原因:1。许多受访者认为,民事处罚缺乏灵活性,作为一种强制执行手段的效用有限。2. 从ASIC的角度来看,有许多替代补救措施似乎比民事处罚更可行。特别是,有提供“实时”补救的禁令,以及公司法第600条,允许ASIC在某些情况下禁止某人管理公司。根据我们采访的许多人的说法,第600条是一种有效的补救措施,因为它不要求ASIC提起法庭诉讼,尽管被禁止的人可以在法庭上挑战ASIC的禁令。为了禁止违反民事处罚规定的人管理公司,ASIC必须提起诉讼。3.一些接受采访的人对在执行方面使用法院所造成的拖延以及法院某些判决所造成的一些解释困难表示保留意见。在解释规范董事职责的基本法定条款(即民事处罚条款)方面的这些不确定性,加强了使用替代执行机制的趋势。4. 有迹象表明,ASIC执法部门的许多人都有刑法背景,因此倾向于采取刑事行动,而不是民事处罚。当时的建议是,随着ASIC人员的变化,这种情况会随着时间的推移而改变。5. 受访者表示,就重大执法事宜与检控署署长联络的规定,令决策过程更加复杂。(ii)民检总署需要确认某项事宜不存在刑事因素,可能会导致延误,从而降低提起民事处罚的机会;这些不同的目标可能会影响民事处罚的可能性。6. 民事处罚条款的起草不明确,特别是关于必须证明违反民事处罚条款而使法院满意的要素,限制了民事处罚的使用。如果同一行为既可能违反民事处罚规定,也可能违反国家刑法规定,则由于民事处罚规定的不确定性,就有动机将该法律行动定性为违反《刑法》。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Regulating Directors' Duties: How Effective are the Civil Penalty Sanctions in the Australian Corporations Law?
The research project examines how the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) uses civil penalties as an enforcement tool against company directors. It identifies and critically evaluates the factors which impact upon ASIC enforcement decisions regarding civil penalties. The methodology employed for the research involved collection of data about the use of civil penalties and a series of semi-structured interviews with senior ASIC enforcement personnel from regional offices around Australia. Those interviewed included: National Director, Enforcement; Regional Commissioner; Regional Director, Enforcement; Regional Assistant Director, Enforcement; and Regional General Counsel. Civil penalties were introduced by the Federal Parliament in 1993 with the expectation that they would be a significant enforcement tool. On 1 July 1998, the Federal Parliament extended the application of civil penalties under the Corporations Law to a number of additional statutory provisions including provisions involving share capital transactions and the management of managed investment schemes. However, our research has found that ASIC has commenced only 14 civil penalty applications relating to 10 case situations since civil penalties were introduced in 1993. The research identifies a number of reasons for this: 1. Civil penalties are seen by many of those interviewed as being inflexible and having limited utility as an enforcement option. 2. There are a number of alternative remedies which, from ASIC's point of view, appear to be more viable than civil penalties. In particular, there are injunctions which provide a "real time" remedy as well as section 600 of the Corporations Law which allows ASIC, in certain circumstances, to ban a person from managing a corporation. Section 600 is an effective remedy according to many of those who we interviewed as it does not require ASIC to bring court proceedings although the person banned may challenge the ASIC banning order in court. In order to ban a person from managing a corporation for breach of a civil penalty provision, ASIC must bring court proceedings. 3. A number of those interviewed expressed reservations about delays associated with use of the courts in the area of enforcement and, in addition, some of the difficulties of interpretation that have resulted from certain judgments of courts. These uncertainties in the interpretation of basic statutory provisions regulating directors' duties (which are civil penalty provisions) reinforce the trend to use alternative enforcement mechanisms. 4. There was some indication that many of those in the enforcement section of ASIC come from a criminal law background and therefore have a tendency to prefer criminal actions rather than civil penalties. The suggestion was that this would change over time as the personnel of ASIC changed. 5. Those interviewed indicated that the requirement to liaise with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) over significant enforcement matters adds another level of complexity to the decision-making process. The consequences resulting from the requirement to liaise with the DPP was a recurring theme in the interviews. These consequences include (i) the requirement means that the DPP effectively has a veto over the use of civil penalties; (ii) the need for the DPP to satisfy itself that there is no criminal element in a matter may result in delay that can undercut the opportunity for a civil penalty action; and (iii) ASIC and the DPP have different enforcement objectives. The role of the DPP is to prosecute criminal breaches of the law while ASIC has broader objectives which include using civil remedies. These different objectives can impact upon the likelihood of civil penalties being pursued. 6. Unclear drafting of the civil penalty provisions, particularly regarding the elements that must be proved to satisfy the court that a breach of a civil penalty provision has occurred, limits the use of civil penalties. Where the same conduct may breach both a civil penalty provision and a provision in a State Criminal Code, there is an incentive to frame the legal action as a breach of the Criminal Code because of the uncertainty surrounding the civil penalty provisions.
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