{"title":"市场大幅下跌和证券诉讼:披露不利收益新闻的含义","authors":"D. Donelson, Justin J. Hopkins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2386099","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study finds that large marketwide declines in stock prices are associated with higher litigation incidence and settlements even though marketwide events are legally irrelevant. The probability of litigation nearly doubles (from 0.29% to 0.55%) and the amount of settlements also doubles (from $5.0 million to $10.1 million) when earnings disclosures occur during a large market decline, even after controlling for the firm’s market-adjusted return. Furthermore, judges with (without) specialized experience in securities litigation are more (less) likely to dismiss cases triggered by disclosures during large market declines. This pattern is consistent with experienced judges recognizing and dismissing weaker cases. Finally, managers are less likely to disclose adverse news at the end of trading days with large market declines. Although we cannot definitively identify the motive behind this pattern, it is consistent with managers recognizing increased litigation risk during large market declines. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting .","PeriodicalId":429515,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Large Market Declines and Securities Litigation: Implications for Disclosing Adverse Earnings News\",\"authors\":\"D. Donelson, Justin J. Hopkins\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2386099\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study finds that large marketwide declines in stock prices are associated with higher litigation incidence and settlements even though marketwide events are legally irrelevant. The probability of litigation nearly doubles (from 0.29% to 0.55%) and the amount of settlements also doubles (from $5.0 million to $10.1 million) when earnings disclosures occur during a large market decline, even after controlling for the firm’s market-adjusted return. Furthermore, judges with (without) specialized experience in securities litigation are more (less) likely to dismiss cases triggered by disclosures during large market declines. This pattern is consistent with experienced judges recognizing and dismissing weaker cases. Finally, managers are less likely to disclose adverse news at the end of trading days with large market declines. Although we cannot definitively identify the motive behind this pattern, it is consistent with managers recognizing increased litigation risk during large market declines. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting .\",\"PeriodicalId\":429515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-05-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"17\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386099\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Shareholders in Corporate Governance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386099","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Large Market Declines and Securities Litigation: Implications for Disclosing Adverse Earnings News
This study finds that large marketwide declines in stock prices are associated with higher litigation incidence and settlements even though marketwide events are legally irrelevant. The probability of litigation nearly doubles (from 0.29% to 0.55%) and the amount of settlements also doubles (from $5.0 million to $10.1 million) when earnings disclosures occur during a large market decline, even after controlling for the firm’s market-adjusted return. Furthermore, judges with (without) specialized experience in securities litigation are more (less) likely to dismiss cases triggered by disclosures during large market declines. This pattern is consistent with experienced judges recognizing and dismissing weaker cases. Finally, managers are less likely to disclose adverse news at the end of trading days with large market declines. Although we cannot definitively identify the motive behind this pattern, it is consistent with managers recognizing increased litigation risk during large market declines. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting .