市场大幅下跌和证券诉讼:披露不利收益新闻的含义

D. Donelson, Justin J. Hopkins
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引用次数: 17

摘要

本研究发现,尽管市场事件在法律上无关紧要,但市场范围内股票价格的大幅下跌与更高的诉讼发生率和和解有关。即使在控制了公司经市场调整后的回报率后,在市场大幅下跌期间披露收益时,诉讼的可能性几乎翻了一番(从0.29%增至0.55%),和解金额也翻了一番(从500万美元增至1010万美元)。此外,有(没有)证券诉讼专业经验的法官更有可能(更不可能)驳回在市场大幅下跌期间披露信息引发的案件。这种模式与经验丰富的法官承认和驳回较弱的案件是一致的。最后,在市场大幅下跌的交易日结束时,基金经理不太可能披露不利消息。虽然我们不能明确地确定这种模式背后的动机,但这与基金经理认识到在市场大幅下跌期间诉讼风险增加是一致的。这篇论文被会计Mary Barth接受了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Large Market Declines and Securities Litigation: Implications for Disclosing Adverse Earnings News
This study finds that large marketwide declines in stock prices are associated with higher litigation incidence and settlements even though marketwide events are legally irrelevant. The probability of litigation nearly doubles (from 0.29% to 0.55%) and the amount of settlements also doubles (from $5.0 million to $10.1 million) when earnings disclosures occur during a large market decline, even after controlling for the firm’s market-adjusted return. Furthermore, judges with (without) specialized experience in securities litigation are more (less) likely to dismiss cases triggered by disclosures during large market declines. This pattern is consistent with experienced judges recognizing and dismissing weaker cases. Finally, managers are less likely to disclose adverse news at the end of trading days with large market declines. Although we cannot definitively identify the motive behind this pattern, it is consistent with managers recognizing increased litigation risk during large market declines. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting .
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