Integration

This chapter argues that while Elizabeth Anderson’s recent integrationist argument for affirmative action justifies some forms of affirmative action, it does not justify affirmative action across the board. Moreover, in those versions where it does provide some justification for some schemes of affirmative action, it might be reducible to particular versions of the discrimination mitigation-based or the equality of opportunity-based arguments. In those cases where it is not so reducible, it represents a novel way of thinking about affirmative action, to wit, in light of the so-called relational ideal of justice as opposed to distributive ideals of justice. When so construed, however, the integrationist argument cannot stand alone, since it implies, implausibly, that we should possibly be indifferent between affirmative action for those who are worse off and preferential treatment of the privileged in relation to low-ranking jobs in the occupational hierarchy, etc.